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The START Proposal: Verification Issues 
Introduction 
At Eureka College on May 9, 1982 President Reagan gave a basic outline 
of the approach that the United States will pursue in the upcoming START 
(STrategic Arms Reduction Talks) talks. This approach, not all of which 
was detailed in the Eureka speech, involves two phases: 
Phase 1: a mutual limit for the United States and the Soviet Union 
of 5,000 warheads on no more than 850 ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles) and SLBMs (Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles). Within that limit 
no more that 2,500 warheads could be deployed on land-based ICBMs. This 
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reduction would take place over a 5 to 10 year period. 
Phase 2: the aggregate throw weight (i.e., the sum of the payload 
capacities of all ballistic missiles expressed in poundage for reentry 
vehicles of all types, both warheads and decoys) of both forces would 
be equalized. The United States will reportedly seek to have the limit 
on ICBM throw weight be no larger than that of the current U.S. ICBM 
force (approximately 2,220,330 lbs., as opposed to 9,954,100 lbs. 
2 / - 
for Soviet ICBMs). This phase would also take other systems into 
account, and would seek further reductions as well. 
1/ The Administration reportedly is willing to allow equal numbers of 
bombers to both sides, but without limit on the weapons they carry. Such 
a limit would include the controversial Soviet Backfire bomber. See 
Corddry, Charles W. Bombers, too, subject to arms cuts, U.S. sources say. 
Baltimore Sun, May 21, 1982: A4. 
2 /  These figures were calculated by A.A. Tinajero, Specialist in 
~ational Defense, CRS. 
As with all other arms control proposals, the ability of both sides 
to adequately verify* compliance with these agreements will be crucial. 
Indeed, verification requirements have become key determinants in shaping 
agreements, as well as means of checking on compliance. The SALT I limits 
on launchers rather than missiles or warheads was in part an expression of 
monitoring** capabilities and their limits. In the still-pending SALT I1 
Treaty, strategic arms control moved from wholly quantitative to some 
qualitative limits, in part through the introduction of counting rules 
and planned observable differences in systems as aids to monitoring and 
verification. 
The debate over SALT I1 in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
also indicated how important the adequacy of verification is in gaining 
congressional approval. Thus, for political as well as security reasons 
the adequate verification of the Reagan START proposal, or any eventual 
strategic arms agreement, will be crucial. 
This paper examines some of the monitoring and verification impli- 
cations of the START proposal. The analysis is limited by the fact that 
no comprehensive document exists. This analysis will be based on the 
outline of the proposal as summarized above. 
* Verification experts do not use the word "verifiability," as this 
is seen as an absolute term implying a capability which cannot be attained. 
Instead, they speak of the "adequacy" of verification, which is in turn ex- 
pressed in terms of levels of confidence (High, High Moderate, Moderate, Low 
and Very Low) in the "adequacy." See the testimony of Harold Brown in U.S. 
Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The SALT I1 Treaty. Hearings, 
96th Congress, 1st session on EX. Y, 96-1. July 16-19, 1979. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. Part 2, pp. 240-41.  
** Monitoring is the actual collection of data on arms control and 
other activities; verification is the process by which these data are 
assessed and decisions are made as to significance and necessary responses. 
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Reduction of ICBMs, SLBMs and Warheads 
The major goal of the Reagan proposal is to reduce the number of 
MIRVed (Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle) long-range 
ballistic missiles on both sides down to equal levels, as these are seen 
as being the most destabilizing weapons in either strategic arsenal. 
The proposed reduction here is two-fold: a limit of 850 ICBMs and SLBMs, 
and a reduction of ballistic missile warheads from the current level 
of approximately 7,500 down to 5,000, with no more than 2,500 warheads 
on ICBMs. This entails three sets of verification issues: the reduction 
and continued limit on ICBMs and on SLRMs, and an agreed method for 
determining the number of warheads. 
The problem of reducing ICBM and SLBM forces was already addressed 
in SALT 11, which included a sub-limit of 1200 MIRVed ballistic missile 
launchers, of which no more than 820 could be ICBMs. For the Soviet 
Union this would have required a reduction from 1398 ICBM and 950 SLBM 
launchers in their inventory as of December 1979. There was also an 
aggregate limit of 2,250 strategic weapon launchers (ICBMs, SLBMs, and 
heavy bombers). However, it must be emphasized that these limits and 
reductions concerned the launchers, and not the missiles. It is not 
clear, at this moment, whether the Reagan proposal addresses only 
deployed missiles or deployed missiles and launchers. The Administration 
reportedly plans to build START to some extent on the basic framework 
3 1 - 
of SALT. 
3 /  See, for example, the testimony of Secretary of State Alexander Haig 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, concerning Nuclear Arms Reduc- 
tion Proposals, May 11, 1982 (hearings not printed yet). 
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The difference is very important for its effect on monitoring and 
verification. If the reduction in the number of missiles was not accom- 
panied by a dismantling of their launchers without inspection or some new 
means of verification, there would be a large potential for cheating by 
secretly deploying additional missiles in existing ICBM silos or SLBM 
tubes. Thus, for the sake of prudence one would have to assume that any 
reduction in missile forces would also require the dismantling of the 
excess ICBM launchers and SLBM tubes. 
Procedures already exist for dismantling ICBM and SLBM launchers. 
Specific details remain classified, but in general the dismantling pro- 
cedures require rendering the launchers wholly inoperable and incapable 
of being easily restored to working condition. For ICBMs this entails 
removing the cables and wires, severing all connections with available power 
sources, destroying the silo itself, and then filling in the blown silo 
with dirt. In the case of SLBMs the launch tubes must be rendered 
inoperable, either by destroying the submarine, cutting away the sections 
with the tubes and welding together the remaining sections of the hull, 
or removing a certain percentage of the tubes and welding plates over 
the areas removed. Such procedures would still be required if the number 
of launchers were to be reduced and not be readily restorable to operational 
readiness. 
Reducing the number of MIRVs has to date been dependent, in part, on 
counting rules long urged by the United States and finally accepted by the 
Soviets in SALT 11. The most important is "Once MI~ved, all M I R V ~ ~ , "  
which applies to certain Soviet missiles (SS-17, SS-18, SS-19) which are 
which are dual capable, i.e., have been tested in both single RV (reentry 
vehicle) and MIRVed types. The United States argued that once a missile 
was in a silo the number of RVs could not be determined, and therefore 
it must be presumed to be carrying the maximum number of MIRVs with 
which it had been tested and observed by national technical means. 
Verification of this reduction is in part dependent on an accurate 
and agreed data base, drawn largely from test observations of the dispensing 
of RVs from the "bus" on which they are carried. Such a data base existed 
4 / -
as part of the SALT I1 agreement, as follows: 
United States Soviet Union 
Minuteman 111 - 7 RVs SS-17 - 4 RVs 
Poseidon C-3 - 14 RVs SS-18 - 10 RVs* 
Trident C-4 - 7 RVs SS-19 - 6 RVs 
SS-N-18 - 7 RVs 
This data base is of significance; Secretary of State Alexander Haig has 
already stated that some of the data already compiled in past agreements 
5 / -
will be used for START. However, in SALT I1 the United States stated 
that the Minuteman I11 ICBMs had been deployed with only 3 RVs despite 
their capacity for 7 RVs, and that this would not be increased. Under a 
reduced strategic arms regime it would be very difficult for either side 
4/ SALT I1 Treaty, First Agreed Statement to Article IV, Par. 10. - 
* The SS-18 has reportedly been testing in a manner to allow the 
dispensing of 14 RVs. 
5 /  See Haig's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
cited-in n. 3 above. 
to accept such a statement, given the increased incentives for non-compliance 
(see below: Break-out: Incentives for Cheating). 
In the absence of an agreed data base and strict counting rules dependent 
on the maximum number of MIRVs tested, monitoring the number of MIRVs would 
be extremely difficult, as there is no sure way, other than physical inspection, 
that the number of MIRVs on a missile can be determined once the missile is 
in its launcher. Inspection would require an intrusive on-site procedure, 
perhaps by one another or by a neutral third party or group, which would 
probably not be acceptable to the Soviet Union, and perhaps not to the 
United States either. Furthermore, unless such an inspection were compre- 
hensive and repeated it would leave unresolved any doubts about additional 
MIRV deployments. 
Production 
While the actual number of missiles deployed may be limited, it is 
probable that the production of additional missiles will continue, either 
for test purposes, or as part of ongoing force modernizations and improve- 
ments, as was to be allowed in SALT I1 for both regular replacements 
6 / - 
and for improved missiles. Presumably some such allowances would be sought 
by the United States in START, especially as the M-X and Trident I1 D-5 missiles 
are not scheduled to be deployed until 1986 and 1989, respectively. 
Continued production raises a number of compliance issues. First, 
there is the question already raised concerning the fate of excess launchers. 
6 1  See the SALT I1 Treaty, Article IV, Pars. 4 and 5, and Article X. - 
If these launchers were not dismantled there would be the danger of additional 
missiles being placed in them in violation of the agreement. 
Second, there will be continued concern about the Soviet SS-17 and 
SS-18 missiles, which are cold-launched, i.e., the missiles are elevated 
above their silos and then fired, leaving the silos available for further 
use. The ability of the Soviets to rapidly reload these silos, especially 
under wartime conditions, is still a matter of debate among members of U.S. 
intelligence agencies. Nevertheless, there remains the danger that these 
silos could be reloaded in a fairly short time, again raising the issue 
of excess and undetected production of missiles, perhaps in facilities 
7 1 -
close to launch sites so as to avoid detection during transportation. 
While certain activities associated with the production of missiles (or 
any other manufacturing) can be detected, such as the transport of raw 
materials to the plant, the changing of work shifts, etc., the actual 
product cannot be ascertained without seeing it removed from the plant 
or without someone in the plant to see it. This once again raises the 
issue of some more intrusive form of inspection than has currently been 
accepted, and its reliability as an adequate means of verification. 
Throw Weight 
Although the Reagan proposal does not foresee going to some equivalence 
in throw weight until the second phase of START, this concept will raise 
71 SALT I1 specifically prohibited the development, test or deploy- 
ment Gf rapid reload ICBM launchers, and forbade the storage of excess 
ICBMs "above normal deployment...at launch sites of ICBM launcher&." See 
SALT I1 Treaty, Article IV, Par. 5. The issues of prodcution and cold 
launch raise further questions about the proximity of storage facilities 
to launch sites, and the necessity of hardening them as perhaps one indica- 
tion of their use. 
monitoring issues immediately. Verification efforts are dependent on data 
bases, either agreed numbers of weapons, launchers or warheads, or on data 
obtained during observed tests of missiles as to their overall capabilities 
(launch weight, throw weight, range, number of MIRVs, etc.). Secretary 
of Defense Brown testified during the Senate's consideration of SALT I1 
that a weapon system requires between 20 and 30 tests before it can be 
considered reliable, and that a sufficient number of these tests can be 
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successfully monitored to provide a data base for verification. 
Those systems already in the Soviet arsenal have obviously gone 
through this test sequence, and will only be tested now on a more sporadic 
basis to insure continued reliability. This significantly reduces U.S. 
monitoring opportunities, which are also made more difficult by the nature 
of the monitoring task required for throw weight. Unlike MIRV deployment, 
which is "observable" either directly or through radar and other surveillance 
techniques even when Soviet test flights do not leave Soviet territory, 
monitoring throw weight requires more complete monitoring from launch to 
reentry. This is largely dependent on signal intelligence, i.e., inter- 
cepting the signals, or telemetry, sent by the missile back to the test 
center on its performance, which are then used as the basis for complex 
calculations (called mensuration) from which throw weight estimates 
9 / -
are made. 
81 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The SALT I1 
~reaty. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session, on EX. Y, 96-1. July 16-19, 1979. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. Part 2, pp. 242-43, 258. 
91 See U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. 
SALT Verification [by] Mark M. Lowenthal. Report NO. 78-142 F. Updated 
April 24, 1979. p. 17. 
These data have already been the subject of extreme controversy 
because of Soviet encryption, or encoding of the telemetry so that it can be 
intercepted but not necessarily understood. The SALT I1 agreement contained 
a provision banning "deliberate concealment measures which impede verification," 
lo/ -
including "telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification." 
There have been frequent accusations that the Soviets have encrypted past 
tests in order to impede verification, although U.S. officials have denied 
that the encryption has had that effect. Continued Soviet encryption does 
raise the possibility that necessary data could be denied. Nor do the SALT I1 
provisions against encryption, which both sides are presumably tacitly ob- 
serving, mean that encryption will cease. Rather, encryption which one 
side feels is impeding verification is then brought up at a meeting of the 
Standing Consultative Commission, where the issue is then discussed and 
negotiated.* 
In order for the limit on throw weight to be introduced in phase two 
of the Reagan proposal it would appear be necessary to begin monitoring tests 
well before then in order to establish a sufficient data base. This raises 
several questions. One is the sufficiency of the current data base. 
Closely related to that it the question of how large a data base can be 
expected for Soviet missiles already in their arsenal, which have presumably 
10/ SALT I1 Treaty, Article XV, Par. 3 and Second Common Understanding. -
* The Standing Consultative Commission is the U.S.-Soviet forum for 
considering compliance questions. It is important to understand that the 
SCC does not function as a judicial proceeding, with the introduction of 
evidence and a subsequent verdict, but rather as a forum for raising and 
negotiating outstanding issues. Thus, raising an issue does not necessarily 
insure the desired outcome. 
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been through the normal number of test flights. If the current data base 
is insufficient, and if the Soviets do not have a large enough number of 
subsequent tests, then there could be problems in establishing a data base 
for throw weight limits. Further, if there are new Soviet tests and the 
telemetry is encrypted, this raises the question of its effect on verifica- 
tion. In order to have a data base ready in time for Phase 2 of the START 
proposal these questions will presumably have to be dealt with as part of 
the negotiations for Phase 1. 
Break-out: The Incentive for Cheating 
One of the major concerns in undetected cheating on arms control 
agreements is the issue of break-out, the ability of one side to secretly 
amass a significant number of additional weapons so as to upset the strategic 
balance. In the past some analysts have argued that the respective forces 
on both sides were so large that any cheating which could go undetected would 
be too small to upset the balance. 
However, in the START arms control regime the size of the relative 
forces decreases, also decreasing the number of weapons necessary to alter 
the balance. While this does not argue against the concept of reduction, 
which is a generally agreed goal, it does raise an unfortunate side effect. 
Moreover, should one side decide that it is worth the risk of detection to 
violate the agreement, the absence of strong verification measures could 
add to that incentive. Two areas discussed above seem to be ~articularly 
susceptible to this temptation. The first is the question of excess 
launchers; if these are not fully dismantled, the covert introduction of 
additional missiles could pose a danger. Second, there is the problem of 
counting MIRVs; unless a counting rule crediting each missile with the 
maximum number of MIRVs already tested is adopted there would be a quite easy 
opportunity for a power to cheat by increasing its YIRVs above the agreed 
limit. 
As noted, break-out would be more attainable as reductions in strategic 
forces proceed, simply because the numbers involved become smaller. A "sig- 
nificant" advantage in nuclear weapons cannot be determined with any pre- 
cision. The advantage is in part dependent on the size of the reduced forces, 
and in part may always remain a perceptual issue. The implied threat of 
enhanced motivation to cheat, however, underscores the importance of 
stringent verification in order to prevent such an imbalance. 
START Verification and Force Structure 
Just as verification has become a major determinant of the shaping of 
SALT I and SALT 11, under START the influence of this requirement may deepen 
and could become a major factor shaping negotiated force structures. 
The reason for this lies in the discrepancy between the tested MIRV 
capabilities of some missiles and the number of MIRVs actually deployed 
on them. At least four missiles would appear to be particular problems 
in this area: (1) U.S. Minuteman I11 has been tested with up to 7 RVs, 
although its deployment is reportedly with a maximum of 3 RVs; (2) U.S. 
Poseidon has been tested with 14 RVs, but reportedly carries an average of 
9 or 10 RVs; ( 3 )  U.S. M-X has been designed to carry up to 12 RVs, although 
it has not been tested yet; its currently presumed deployment would be with 
10 RVs; (3) the Soviet SS-18 has been tested with a dispensing capability of 
up to 14 RVs; it has three deployments, 1 RV, 8 RVs, and 10 RVs. 
If it was assumed that strict counting rules were established under 
START, in which each missile was credited with having the maximum number 
of RVs with which it had been tested regardless of stated deployment, 
then both powers would have to drastically reduce their missile forces 
in order to accommodate only 5,000 warheads, of which only 2,500 could 
be on ICBMs. There would then also be an incentive to deploy the maximum 
number of warheads on each missile with which it had been tested, as each 
missile would be counted as having that many in any case. 
The following table shows how a strict RV count, regardless of actual 
deployment, would severely limit the force structure of both nations: 
Number of Max. Number RV s Current RV Count 
Missile Missiles RVs Tested Deployed RV Count Under Maximum 
Minuteman I11 550 7 3 1650 3850 
Poseidon 32 0 14 9-10 2880-3200 4480 
M-X 100 10-12* 10-12* 1000 1200" 
SS-18 (Various 58 1 58) 812) 
Mods ) 
225) 14 8 1800) 2108 3150) 4312 
The verification problem posed by ICBMs is difficult, given the 
accuracy ICBMs offer compared to all other systems. However, individual 
missiles can be added or deleted as necessary, allowing relative fine 
tuning of force structure. But SLBMs pose a much more difficult problem, 
as these missiles are not deployed individually, but in groups on SSBNs 
* The M-X will presumably be tested with 10 MIRVs, although it will 
have the capacity for 12. 
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(nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines). Thus, one Ohio-class 
submarine carries 24 Trident I missiles, each with 8 RVs, for a total of 
192 RVs. Therefore, a relatively small number of SLBMs could use up a 
significant portion of the 5,000 warhead total. 
Such an effect on force structure would drastically reduce the 
number of launchers on both sides, perhaps below the 850 currently sought 
by the Administration. This, in turn, could introduce an increased element 
of strategic instability, as the perceived prospects for a successful first 
strike might appear to be enhanced as the number of targets decreases. Here 
again there could be a further incentive to cheat in order to attain that 
first strike capability. This analysis underscores how interconnected all 
of these verification issues are, and the difficulty in isolating them from 
from one another. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Changing the "units of account" for strategic arms agreements from 
launchers to missiles and warheads and ultimately with compliance on throw 
weight imposes new verification requirements: 
Missile Reduction: the number of missiles can be reduced, but without new 
safeguards this reduction could be rendered meaningless without a concomitant 
dismantling of excess launchers to prevent cheating. 
Warhead Reduction and Limit: a set of strict counting rules (once MIRVed, 
all MIRVed; and all missiles counted as carrying the maximum number of MIRVs 
with which they have been tested) would obviate some monitoring problems. 
Such rules, however, would also have a dramatic effect on START force struc- 
tures, severely reducing the allowed number of launchers and therefore also 
increasing first strike risks and temptations. An alternative to these 
rules would be more intrusive inspection, which raises separate issues 
of political acceptability, practicality and adequacy. 
Production: excess launcher capacity could make new missiles a threat 
to stability. The issue of Soviet cold-launched missiles and the deploy- 
ment of the cold-launched U.S. M-X also remain to be dealt with. 
Throw Weight: the necessary data base for Phase 2 throw weight reduc- 
tions must be dealt with in Phase 1. A major issue here is that of telemetry 
encryption and its effect on monitoring. 
Verification was originally seen, in part, as a confidence-building 
measure in the arms control Drocess, although it has not functioned in that 
11 1 -
manner. Indeed, verification has become a major point of contention with 
enacted agreements, with advantages going to those who accuse the Government 
of being lax on alleged Soviet violations. The consideration of SALT I1 
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also showed how important 
verification has become as part of the process of congressional approval for 
any strategic arms agreement. 
In summary, Reagan Administration spokesmen have attacked past verifi- 
cation standards, and have made adequate verification a keystone of their arms 
1 2 1  - 
control policy, while now attempting to take the strategic arms control 
111 Lowenthal, SALT Verification, pp. 64-65. -
1 2 1  See, for example, Secretary of State Haig's opening statement 
beforzhe Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 11, 1982 (hearing 
cited in n. 3 above), in which he said any new agreement must have 
"effective verification, with the necessary counting rules, collateral 
restraints, and cooperative measures." 
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process into new ~ n d  more complex directions, in terms of both the 
agreements themselves and the required monitoring tasks and verification 
decisions. 
